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ABSTRACT 
2016 marks the centenary of Democracy and Education, in which Dewey argued 
for the mutually dependent relationship linking a legitimate education system and 
a thriving democracy. A century later, it seems, democracy and education have 
been decoupled, with both undermined by developments such as growing 
inequality, declining participation and trust in democratic processes, techno-
rationalism that reframes political issues in terms of efficiency, and growing 
political extremism. Meanwhile, recent years have seen the increasing grip of 
market-based principles and techniques of measurement and evaluation as state-
endorsed norms across various sectors and domains of society, including 
education, reflecting an instrumentalism Lacan described in terms of ‘the service 
of goods’. Against this background, this paper draws on resources from political 
and psychoanalytic theory to rethink and reanimate the links between education 
and democracy, thereby encouraging and emboldening educators to, in David 
Harvey’s words, “write the poetry of their own future”. 
Keywords: democracy, education, politics, Dewey 
__________________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
Democracy is currently at the forefront of many of our minds. This is partly the 
result of recent referenda, on Brexit and Scottish independence, not to mention 
the election in 2016 of the controversial figure of Donald Trump as the 45th 
President of the United States of America. But it is also due to a pervasive sense 
that, in one way or another, our democratic systems are not functioning today as 
well as they could or should. The same could also be said of our education 
systems, which, here and in many other contexts, seem to have been hijacked by 
the juggernauts of standards and accountability and which seem to alienate, rather 
than inspire, many of our teachers and students. In this talk, I want to explore the 
links between these two trends. I do this by looking at education and democracy 
through the insights offered by an unlikely third conceptual space, namely 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and its uptake in political and literary theory. 
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At first glance, democracy, education and psychoanalysis may seem like a 
rather unlikely and eclectic mixture. Part of my justification for bringing them 
together derives from Freud’s (1937) identification of governing, educating and 
psychoanalysing as three impossible professions. But more positively, a common 
characteristic of democracy, education and psychoanalysis is a desire for 
freedom – freedom of thought and speech, action and association. More 
specifically, they each offer at least potential sites “by which we question and 
deconstruct the tyranny of imposed meanings in favour of expressive freedom” 
(Gentile & Macrone 2016: XXIV). With this in mind, the paper will comprise three 
sections: the first section offers an examination democracy. The discussion will 
bring to bear ideas from psychoanalytic theory, including notions of enjoyment 
and fantasy, as well as literary theorist Lauren Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism. 
The second section will turn to explore education, again bringing notions of 
enjoyment, fantasy and cruel optimism to bear on the discussion and introducing 
the notion of agonistic, as opposed to procedural, democracy. The third section 
will briefly share a few examples of research into prefigurative practices that seek 
to enact and usher in alternative realities, as well as touching on 
psychoanalytically inspired ideas from the work of Kaja Silveman of passionate 
resymbolisation and world spectatorship, which may help us to cultivate openness 
to the fissures and dislocations through which a democracy that can never be 
institutionalised may enter into our practices. 
DEMOCRACY UNDER THREAT 
Democracy may be at the forefront of our minds now – but so it was for John 
Dewey, when he asserted the mutually dependent relationship linking a legitimate 
education system and a thriving democracy in his 1916 book, Democracy and 
Education. A century later, many would argue that democracy and education have 
been decoupled and that both have been diminished and devalued as a result 
(Labaree 2011; Schostak & Goodson 2012). Indeed, some have argued that we 
are living in a ‘post-democratic’ society (Crouch 2004), something reflected in a 
number of critical developments.  
These developments include the growing inequality in wealth and income that 
has accompanied the spread of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is, of course, a 
contested term and one, interestingly, that is almost only ever used in a pejorative 
sense. As a ‘shorthand’ definition, however, I would endorse the one offered by 
political economist, Will Davies (2014), who reads neoliberalism as ‘the 
disenchantment of politics by economics’. But returning to inequality, increasing 
gaps between rich and poor were recently highlighted as a threat to economic 
growth and social stability by the OECD (2014) and the IMF – hardly the most 
radical or revolutionary of organisations – as well as by authors such as Joseph 
Stiglitz (2013), Thomas Piketty (2014), Antony Atkinson, (2015), Danny Dorling 
(2011, 2014) and Yannis Varoufakis (2016), to name just a few.  
The growth in economic inequality has been accompanied by a resurgence of 
the influence of money in politics and by what Owen Jones (2015) describes as a 
series of revolving doors connecting positions of power with access to wealth. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, these developments have been accompanied by declining 
participation in democratic processes and diminishing trust in political actors in 
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Western and other contexts (Mair 2013). This declining faith in politics has been 
directly linked to the outcome of the Brexit vote and the recent election of Donald 
Trump, but it can also be seen in the related trend of growing extremism in Europe, 
North America, Australia and elsewhere, including religious extremism and 
growing support for extremist political parties, particularly those of the popular 
right.  
Underlying the frustration that these developments reflect, is the translation of 
democratic deliberation and decision making into techno-rational matters, framed 
in terms of instrumentalism and efficiency and expressed in the impersonal 
language of targets and indicators. Today’s democracies work, in this sense, by 
placing certain economic fundamentals, regarding growth, investment, profit and 
competition, off-limits, as far as disagreement and debate are concerned, so of 
course the expanding cohorts of wealthy plutocrats extoll the virtues of democracy 
– after all, it can’t hurt them, since it has largely been tamed and domesticated. As
Wendy Brown (2006, 2015) has argued, recent decades have witnessed a
process of de-democratization, whereby democracy is emptied of its substance
without being formally abolished.
The increasing grip of neoliberalism’s instrumentalist ethic that elevates 
market-based principles and techniques of measurement and evaluation and 
enshrines them as state-endorsed norms, is evident across all sectors and 
domains of society from health care to housing and transport. And, of course, we 
are only too familiar with this instrumentalist ethic in education. The measurement 
and evaluation of the performance of education systems, schools, teachers and 
students in relation to tests such as PISA and SATS, or in relation to the targets 
and indicators of performance utilised by OFSTED, has had the consequence of 
narrowing the curriculum in order to concentrate resources on improving 
performance outcomes. But, as I and many others have argued, it has also led to 
the decontestation and depoliticisation of education as a field, as the means of 
evaluating education performance have become ends in themselves. Questions 
about the nature and purposes of education are thus removed from democratic 
purview, raising questions about the vitality of contemporary links between 
democracy and education (Biesta 2013; Clarke 2012, In press). For as Dewey 
argued, “democracy cannot flourish where the chief influences in selecting subject 
matter of instruction are utilitarian ends narrowly conceived” (1963: 209).  
Working hand-in-hand with neoliberalism’s instrumentalist ethic and its 
calculative performance regimes, is a competitive logic that has become 
enshrined as the core principle underlying the progress of both individuals and 
societies (Dardot & Laval 2013; Davies, 2014). Drawing inspiration from Herbert 
Spencer and his misappropriation of Darwin’s ideas of natural selection, 
neoliberals have insisted on the insertion of competitive mechanisms into all 
areas of institutional life in the name of ‘driving up standards’ as the catch phrase 
has it. This is despite the fact that for Darwin, as Patrick Tort (2008) has shown, 
civilisation was characterised by social instincts such as empathy and 
collaboration that are capable of neutralising and overcoming the elimination 
inherent in natural selection (Dardot & Laval 2013: 33). The unfortunate effect of 
neoliberalism’s Spencerian ‘survival of the fittest’ discourse has been to 
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delegitimise aid and assistance to the disenfranchised who are deemed to be 
responsible for, and hence can be abandoned to, their fate. 
At this point, we might well concur with Jodi Dean’s comment that “what 
democracy might mean, or the range of possibilities democracy is meant to 
encompass, remains unclear, to say the least” (Dean 2009: 75). She goes on to 
note how – and it gets worse – “real, existing democracies privilege the wealthy. 
As they install, extend, and protect neoliberal capitalism, they exclude, exploit, 
and oppress the poor, all the while promising that everyone wins” (p. 76). This 
flagrant contradiction between the false promises of inclusion and access to ‘the 
good life’, on the one hand, and the reality of growing inequality and 
disenfranchisement, on the other, is captured powerfully by Lauren Berlant’s 
notion of cruel optimism. Berlant uses this term to refer to a situation where we 
are exhorted – by society and by our own internalisation of societal norms – to 
follow courses of action and pursue aspirations that are not only unlikely to be 
realised by which are actually harmful to our well-being. Everyday examples of 
cruel optimism are the fad diets, which hold out the promise of a ‘new you’. Not 
only are these promises unfulfilled, but also, our attachments to them are typically 
toxic to our physical and emotional health.  
In relation to democracy, it could also be argued that it too serves as a form of 
cruel optimism that repeatedly fails to deliver on the hopes, which are not only 
embodied in, but also incited by, the rhetoric and slogans of our politicians. In this 
sense, like politics more widely, democracy has been ‘disenchanted’ by 
economics, with competitiveness in terms of wealth creation as the overriding 
criterion by which any political program is now judged (Davies 2014). Or as 
Wendy Brown puts it, 
insofar as economization of the political and suffusion of public discourse with 
governance eliminate the categories of both the demos and sovereignty, the value 
– even the intelligibility – of popular sovereignty is rubbed out. Economization
replaces a political lexicon with a market lexicon. Governance replaces a political
lexicon with a management lexicon (2015: 207).
If this wasn’t bad enough, the replacement of politics by economics and 
performativity, both of which privilege matters of efficiency over questions of 
purpose, can be linked to the rise of extremism in various guises. As Terry 
Eagleton notes, extremism “is among other things a reaction to a politics which 
has grown vacuously managerial” (Eagleton 2006: 55). In the UK context, the 
recent Brexit campaign provided both nationalist sentiment and racist violence 
with newfound legitimacy, embodying what Henry Giroux and others describe as 
‘proto-fascism’, i.e. an ideology and a set of social practices that scorn the present 
“while calling for a revolution that rescues a deeply anti-modernist past as a way 
to revolutionize the future” (Giroux 2004: 16).  The co-implication of democratic 
governments in anti-democratic practices led Slavoj Žižek, as long ago as 2001, 
to comment that democracy should now be considered a reactionary term and 
argue that it “is more and more a false issue, a notion so discredited by its 
predominant use that, perhaps one should take the risk of abandoning it to the 
enemy” (Žižek 2001: 123).  
But then, democracy has always been a paradoxical term as the young Marx 
knew when he wrote “it is self-evident that all forms of state have democracy as 
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their truth and for that reason are untrue to the extent that they are not democracy” 
(Marx 1975: 89). Chantal Mouffe brings a poststructuralist sense to this paradox, 
noting how the self-sufficient unity of the demos is impossible to the extent that it 
relies on plurality and on the establishment of boundaries between inclusion and 
exclusion. In this regard, one certainty in relation to Brexit was that it revealed in 
the starkest terms the divided and fragmented nature of the demos in the UK. But 
Mouffe also highlights the need to establish limits to popular sovereignty in any 
democracy, in the name of democratic values such as liberty, and the 
irreconcilable tensions between freedom and equality.  
Wendy Brown, on the other hand, rejects the idea of limits to popular 
sovereignty, noting that “democracy is an empty form that can be f illed with a 
variety of bad content and instrumentalized by purposes ranging from nationalist 
xenophobia to racial colonialism [as we saw in the invasion of Iraq], from 
heterosexist to capitalist hegemony”, though she also notes that “it can be 
mobilized within the same regimes to counter these purposes” (p. 209). In 
contrast to Wendy Brown, for whom democracy equates to the rule of the demos, 
John Keane (2009: 868) insists, “democracy champions not the Rule of the 
People – that definition of democracy belongs in more than one way to the Age 
of Monarchy and the Era of Dictatorship and Total Power – but the rule that 
nobody should rule”. For Keane, as for French political philosopher, Jacques 
Ranciere, democracy involves an empty place of power that, once occupied, 
becomes something other. Theorists like Wendy Brown, John Keane and 
Jacques Ranciere capture something of the way that, at its core, democracy has 
always been excessive – replete with radical and unsettling forces that challenge 
notions of balance and orderliness. It was for this reason that democracy was 
viewed by ancient philosophers like Plato with deep suspicion, as something 
excessive and threatening to the rule of the wise elders.  
In psychoanalytic terms, this excess is associated with enjoyment, or 
jouissance – an intense form of pleasure/pain associated with going beyond, or 
transgressing, limits or constraints. This partly explains why activities like smoking 
and drinking offer satisfaction of a different order to, say, eating broccoli. The 
former are tinged with risk and potential sacrifice in a way that the latter just isn’t. 
Indeed, the appeal of popular rightwing parties can be understood in similar 
fashion, in terms of a desire to derive enjoyment from the transgressing the 
limitations imposed by democracy, such as those established by ‘political 
correctness’ – UKIPP supporters want to see themselves as rebellious and 
victimised nationalists, not as magnanimous, obedient or elite ones (McGowan 
2013). Figures such as Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, achieve success by 
seeming to embody this transgressive enjoyment. But why should transgression, 
risk and sacrifice provide enjoyment?  
For Lacan, our entry into the symbolic order of language as subjects brings the 
loss of our pre-subjective sense of oneness with the world. We thereby become 
unnatural beings, remaining forever at a remove from the natural world of which 
can never have immediate, or un-mediated, experience. Signification alienates us 
from our environment by inserting a layer of mediation into all our experience. 
Even something as seemingly straight forward as an apple is entangled in 
discourses and associations, whether of health, technology or original sin, which 
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makes our encounter with it different from that of the animal that just eats it. Of 
course, as subjects, we never experienced this supposedly lost state of oneness 
with the world that the animal enjoys, because it was pre-subjective – prior to our 
formation as social beings of language and the law. Yet we spend our lives 
seeking to recapture the intense enjoyment associated with this purportedly lost 
object, and it is the existential ‘lack’ associated with this loss that fuels the 
insatiability of desire. Indeed, one way of understanding cultural phenomena like 
education is as social strategies for managing enjoyment/jouissance, in part by 
converting these into less unruly forms, such as the desire for approval and 
belonging.  
With the rise of capitalism, and democracy’s suturing with the latter as 
‘democratic capitalism’, its excessive nature and its capacity to serve as a source 
of transgressive enjoyment, has been largely domesticated. This reduces the 
scope for identifying democracy with enjoyment, leaving support for democracy 
reliant on people’s more limited capacity for identifying with the good. Meanwhile, 
as we see in China, and arguably in the neoliberal West too, capitalism is less 
and less reliant on democracy in order to ‘deliver the goods’, with the promise of 
satisfaction provided by ‘excessive’ consumption rendering democracy 
‘excessive’ to capitalism’s needs. Indeed, capitalism operates at a fundamental 
level by holding out the promise of future satisfaction and thus of overcoming our 
constitutive alienation from the world. In other words, neoliberal capitalism frees 
us from freedom’s burden by directing our desires towards compliance and 
consumption (McGowan 2016). It thus offers us the promise of redemption 
through the accumulation of assets, income and goods – or in education, of 
knowledge and qualifications. Yet it does so in ways that keep us as subjects 
clinging tightly to our own ongoing dissatisfaction, enslaved to the fantasmatic 
promise of future fulfilment (McGowan 2016). For enough is never enough – as 
Mick Jagger knew, satisfaction is the one thing we cannot get – and in this sense, 
neoliberal capitalism never delivers and offers only a ‘bounced cheque’ (Vadolas 
2012). Ironically, this is also the key to capitalism’s staying power as a mode of 
economic, political and social organisation – enough can never be enough and 
so the system, fuelled by the promise of future satisfaction, just keeps on going, 
endlessly searching for the perfect commodity which promises an end to the 
search. 
NOSTALGIA AND FANTASY IN DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 
Aside from the future, the other location of unrealisable fantasmatic satisfaction 
is the past. In this sense, looking back at Brexit and surveying the post-Brexit 
political landscape highlights the relevance of Paul Hoggett’s comment on how 
pervasive the past is in the present: “how the premodern (and particularly the 
sacred, magical and mythical) constantly inserts itself into the body of the modern: 
in nationalism and the myth of the chosen people, in the renewed vigour of 
modern charismatics [such as Trump] and in the millenarianism of totalitarian 
ideologies” (2015: 175). Indeed, the mythical evocations of extremist and 
popularist forms of politics are a key source of their appeal in that they seem to 
offer a sense of stability and belonging that capitalism does not, and more 
importantly, cannot provide. 
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The same nostalgia seems to haunt education. We see this, for instance, in 
Theresa May’s push for a return to grammar schools and selective education; we 
see it in the way Victorian notions that children should be seen and not heard 
have taken on a new life in schools where silence is imposed in classrooms and 
corridors; and we see it in the way the disciplinary logic of ‘spare the rod and spoil 
the child’ has found new expression in punitive and authoritarian regimes that 
proudly announce their ‘three strikes and you’re out’, ‘zero-tolerance’ culture. 
These and other developments raise questions, not only around the relationship 
between democracy and education, but about the very meaning of education.  
Let’s turn then to this question of what we might understand by education and 
how it might or might not relate to democracy. Historical and contemporary 
education – at least in the form of formal schooling – might be characterised as a 
form of what Ansgar Allen (2014) describes as ‘benign violence’. In schools, time 
is segmented, and space is partitioned; knowledge is divided and standardised, 
while bodies are disciplined and uniformed. And though we might like to think of 
schools as communities of inquiry, Coffield and Williamson (2011) remind us that 
neoliberalism has overseen the recasting of far too many as little more than exam 
factories focused producing the best grades possible; if this is understandable, 
given the pressures of contemporary policy, it is regrettable nonetheless. In 
Foucauldian terms, schooling can be read as a technology for producing docile 
subjects through the application of the means of correct training and their 
internalisation in the form of technologies of the self. We might indeed ask why 
anyone should expect schools to be spaces of democracy, given the role of 
schools in reproducing and unequal social structure and their history of training 
individuals to accept their insertion into a hierarchical society. But in Foucauldian 
terms, power relations are never total and may elicit defiance or resistance, rather 
than compliance; agitation for democratisation is one form such resistance may 
take, though democratisation, in turn, may result in retrenchment, resentment or 
paralysis in addition to or instead of inspiration (Fendler 2010: 199). 
Schooling can also be read as another version of cruel optimism that binds 
and attaches subjects to their own disappointment (Moore & Clarke 2016). We 
are told that every child matters and that all have the potential to succeed. As 
teachers, we enter the profession intent on making a difference to individual lives 
and contributing to social improvements. Embodying this optimistic discourse, the 
Conservative party’s March 2016 White Paper envisioned a scenario in which we 
would find educational excellence everywhere. Yet systems of schooling are 
governed by the same logics of scarcity and competition that we see in capitalism. 
Averages require performances to be deemed below, as well as above, average. 
The condition of success for some is the necessarily failure of others. Increasing 
success rates bring predictable accusations of grade inflation, while many of 
those acquiring degrees find themselves saddled with debt and facing 
employment conditions requiring far less knowledge and skill, and offering far less 
remuneration, than their expensive qualifications would suggest they might 
expect to command. 
This pessimistic view of schooling is reflected in the work of David Blacker in 
his (2013) book, The falling rate of learning: Education and the neoliberal 
endgame. Writing from a US perspective, Blacker argues that, as a result of 
49
automation and the offshoring of many formerly middle-class jobs, Western 
governments no longer feel the need to support the ideal of universal public 
education. Blacker argues that the push for privatisation and deregulation, the 
loading of students with increasing levels of debt and the silencing of students’ 
voices are all forms of educational eliminationism – a concept with intentional 
echoes of the Nazi party’s policy of eliminating Europe’s Jewish population. 
On the other hand, as David Harvey notes, massive investment in education 
is the sine non qua for capitalist competiveness and has been a key feature of, 
for example, China’s remarkable recent development. The same is true for other 
Asian economies like Singapore. Education is thus, as Harvey puts it, “in the 
cross-hairs of capitalism’s concerns” (2014: 187), required in order to meet its 
need for a skilled workforce. But education around the world has become a big 
business in its own right and capitalism is, as ever, keen to pay for as little of it as 
possible. Hence, the trends towards privatisation and the growth of fee paying are 
likely to shift the burden of education onto the populace in these contexts, as it 
has in many neoliberal ones. This has the additional consequence, as we have 
witnessed in England, of replacing democratic control of schooling by the demos 
and its elected representatives with control by private interests. 
However, thinking of education something that exceeds the institutional 
limitations of formal schooling invites more open, and potentially optimistic, 
definitions such as that provided by Peter Moss, for whom education is about 
realising potentiality: 
education is holistic; it involves the creation or realisation of the self as a subject, 
not following a predetermined route but creating something new and unique; it 
strives to bring about a subject able to think and speak for herself; but it is also 
about the self in relation to others and the wider society, so that self-realisation is 
not confused with autonomy but presumes interdependence, obligation and 
responsibility (Moss 2014: 93). 
If we seek an education gestured towards in this definition – one that is open 
to possibility and oriented towards inquiry and the discovery of new knowledge 
and insights, rather than merely oriented towards the transmission of the already 
known – we should heed Sarah Amsler’s argument that, in contrast to the 
realpolitik world of neoliberalism, a democratic politics is the only form 
commensurate with the very ontology of possibility (Amsler 2015). But as we have 
seen, democracy can all too easily become business as usual directed towards 
the service of goods, reduced to abstract rights, formal legalism and seeking to 
occupy a mythical ‘center ground’ of ‘middle England’. This is the utilitarian, 
pragmatist ethic, which deems radical change as unrealistic and which reduces 
democracy to regular elections, popular representation and the protection of 
certain freedoms.  
An alternative to this procedural or liberal model of democracy, can be found 
in agonistic models of democracy (e.g. Connolly 1995, 2002, 2004; Honig 2001; 
Mouffe 2000). Agonistic democracy challenges the sedimented grip of the status 
quo by elevating what its theorists refer to as constituent power – the power of 
the democratic body of the people – over constituted power, or the institutional 
and procedural forms that currently hold sway. In addition, agonistic democrats 
argue that meaningful democratic practice requires recognition of: a) the need to 
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engage a plurality of voices; b) the value of contestation and dissensus and; c) 
the inevitably tragic nature of life grounded in acknowledgement of human finitude 
and fallibility which entails that any choice or decision always comes at some cost, 
bringing losses alongside any gains (Wenman 2013). Agonistic democrats are 
hence alive to the disavowals of violence and denials of power relations that lurk 
within assertions of unity and consensus; they know that change can and does 
happen, but they are also aware that it often comes at significant personal and 
social cost.  
As a result, for agonists, democracy is a far more vital matter than is often the 
case in popular media representations of politics in Western democracies. In 
political theorist, John Keane’s words, “when democracy takes hold of people’s 
lives, it gives them a glimpse of the contingency of things. They are injected with 
the feeling that the world can be other than it is – that situations can be countered, 
outcomes altered, people’s lives changed through individual and collective action” 
(Keane 2009: 853).  
But while the sense of optimism and possibility in such words is palpable, and 
while I would never want to urge the resigned fatalistic acceptance of the status 
quo in politics or education as necessary or inevitable, let alone desirable, it is 
equally important not to underestimate the challenges facing democracy and 
more democratic forms of education. Right-wing populism may be locked in a 
fantasy scenario, the non-realisability of which can conveniently be blamed on a 
number of scapegoats, from immigrants to metropolitan elites. But those of us 
who might consider ourselves progressive critics of contemporary democratic 
capitalism and its deleterious influence on education, are not immune to 
fantasmatic thinking, involving the overvaluing of belief and the turning of a blind 
eye to action (Fisher 2009). Thus, for example, we believe that our identities are 
reflected in our anti-capitalist beliefs rather than in our thoroughly capitalist 
behaviours as consumers and actors in the structures of capitalism. Similarly, in 
relation to the obsessive-compulsive circuit of testing, assessment and data 
collection that much education has become reduced to, the system is reproduced 
through the activities and procedures of schooling and education in which we play 
an active part, rather than through our beliefs; indeed to the extent that we hold 
fast in our beliefs that this form of education is a charade, for which we pin the 
blame on convenient ‘others’ like Michael Gove, we may secure the intellectual 
distance that enables us to continue to participate in and reproduce the neoliberal 
regime of schooling and society. We may also derive a frisson of 
enjoyment/jouissance from our students’ or our institutions’ performance in the 
derided circuits/circus of performativity, just as we do from our publication and 
citation data. In this sense, much of our anti-neoliberal writing in education and 
social science share something of the hysterical tenor – written with the 
reassuring safety that our words will not change the world – as the more overtly 
hysterical complaints of the popular right.  
COLLECTIVE EXPERIMENTATION AND TRANSFORMATION THROUGH 
PREFIGURATIVE PRACTICE 
A first step then in resisting the neoliberalisation of education requires us to accept 
our insertion into its machinery at the level of desire and our complicity in terms 
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of our actions. This is no easy task, however. Indeed, far from bringing about the 
changes we ‘believe’ in, to extracting ourselves from the neoliberal machine may 
risk our coherence as educational and professional subjects leading to a literal 
crisis of subjectivity. Fantasies and fantasmatic thinking may limit our movement 
by “holding us captive to the idea that the basic structure of our lives is determined 
in advance rather than constituted in the process of living”; but at the same time 
these fantasies cater to our need for a secure and reassuring sense of ourselves 
and our place in the world (Ruti 2009: 101). Hence, traversing the fantasies 
associated with neoliberalism is not something individuals can realistically 
undertake alone. Resistance requires a collective rather than an individual 
response. As Amy Allen reminds us, “what is missing is the realization that a 
possible way out of this attachment to subjection lies in collective social 
experimentation and political transformation, rather than a Nietzschean emphasis 
on the heroic individual” (Allen 2008: 11-12).  
The idea of collective social experimentation in the service of political 
transformation is captured in the notion of prefigurative practice articulated by 
Gramscian scholar, Carl Boggs, and taken up more recently in the work of Peter 
Moss and Michael Fielding in their book, Radical education and the common 
school: A democratic alternative. For Fielding and Moss, prefigurative practice is 
focused on profound educational and social change. It involves strategic action, 
which may begin with incremental steps, but which is infused with a spirit of 
transgression and is aimed at deeper, longer-term personal and institutional 
transformation. 
I want to briefly share some examples of what may constitute prefigurative 
practices. The first is drawn from recent work that seeks to engage teachers in 
research projects in their school contexts (Hammersley-Fletcher, Clarke, & 
McManus in press). These projects were initially linked to school improvement 
plans but over time and with the support of the researchers, teachers gravitated 
towards projects that had more personal, as well as professional, significance in 
relation to them as biographic actors. The benefits of participation in the project 
for the teachers involved included: developing the confidence to ask 
uncomfortable questions and to elicit and engage plural perspectives in relation 
to these questions, thereby enlivening their own and their colleagues’ professional 
practice and identities; an acceptance of difference, disagreement and 
contestation as constitutive and constructive elements in rethinking areas of 
policy and practice; and engagement in the cut and thrust of research without the 
expectation of finding any final or perfect solutions and with growing confidence 
that mistakes are part of the learning journey and not disasters. 
A second example is drawn from the work of researchers from Vic University, 
Spain, who are working with schools in their region of Catalonia on a number of 
projects seeking to bring about more democratically oriented forms of schooling 
(Collet-Sabé 2017; Collet-Sabé & Tort 2015). One such project has involved 
seven schools that have sought, over the past two years, to improve the ways 
they work with parents and families. Specifically, they worked closely with families 
in an attempt move away from habitual discourses of parents and families as 
problems, and instead to become inclusive spaces for parents, families, students 
and teachers to work collaboratively together on shared projects and issues of 
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concern. These are just two small examples from practice and, as such, they 
cannot possibly do justice to the diverse work in a range of global contexts, such 
as post-Pinochet Chile, where educators are engaged in efforts to rethink and 
reanimate the relations between democracy and education. 
As a conceptual complement to these examples, however, I want to briefly 
explore a way of theorising resistant action by way of a consideration of the ways 
in which the existential lack I highlighted earlier, might be linked to democratic 
agency via creativity and the (re)signification of beauty and care. The point I would 
make here, following Claudia Ruitenberg (2008), is that democracy can never be 
institutionalised and is never firmly ‘in place’ – rather, it enters to intervene, disrupt 
and reveal the unexpected, unanticipated or ignored.  
As noted earlier, in Lacanian theory our emergence as subjects of language 
comes at the price of our loss of unmediated immersion in reality. But our 
subjectivity also brings with it the correlative creation of an unstaunchable, if 
largely unconscious, longing to return to this retroversively-envisaged homeland 
of harmonious oneness with the real. It is in this sense that Lacan argues that we 
are subjects of desire. Yet ironically, our primordial loss is also a precondition for 
care – in Kaja Silverman’s words “only if we pay this exorbitant price [of exile from 
unmediated reality] early in our lives can things and people ‘matter’ to us” (2000: 
38-39). By way of analogy, it is only because we are finite beings that our time in
the world takes on urgency and our projects can assume value. If we were
immortal there would be no particular point in doing anything.
Specifically, Silverman distinguishes between two forms of desire. The first is 
the sort of narcissistic desire, which seeks to iron out the inconsistencies and 
complexities of the world and which views others as objects for bolstering a tightly-
held image of the self; this is the fantasmatic realm occupied by those who would 
take back control or make America great again. Silverman contrasts this with a 
less self-centred desire which seeks to re-experience the jouissance, or pain-
tinged pleasure, of its originary loss through its receptivity “to the resurfacing in 
the present and future of what has been – not as an exercise in solitary narcissistic 
solipsism” (p. 62), but rather as an extension, in ever new directions, of the 
capacity to care. This latter form comprises something like an ethics of desire – 
an ethics grounded in a passion for symbolization, in a delight in the manifold and 
ever new forms that the past can assume” (p. 62). This notion of passionate 
resymbolisation is consonant with the emphasis on pluralism and contestation in 
the agonistic reading of democracy outlined above. It also resonates with Giorgio 
Agamben’s notion of ‘study’, as the purposeless pursuit of knowledge for the 
useless pleasure, rather than the utility, that it brings. From this purview, the world 
is pregnant, not just with meaning, but, to quote Silverman again, “with beauty”. 
She goes on to argue, “our capacity to signify beauty has no limits. It is born of a 
loss which can never be adequately named, and whose consequence is, quite 
simply, the human imperative to engage in ceaseless signification” (p. 146). To 
be open to this human imperative in all students is to be open to the moments 
when, in Ruitenberg’s terms, democracy may enter. But tellingly, in light of my 
earlier points about resistance requiring a social, rather than purely individual, 
stance, she argues that “only as a collectivity can we be equal to the demand, not 
only to find beauty in all of the world’s forms, but to sing forever and in a constantly 
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new way the jubilant song of that beauty” (p. 146). This, surely, suggests that we 
have, at least the potential – to the degree that we are willing to acknowledge and 
embrace it in solidarity, if sometimes in disagreement, with others – to shape the 
world, as much as the world shapes us, and thus to fulfil the obligation Harvey 
claims we have ‘to write the poetry of our own future’. 
CONCLUSION: EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY BEYOND ‘THE SERVICE OF 
GOODS’ 
To conclude, then, the intensified form of neoliberalism known as austerity 
represents not just a fiscal, but an intellectual, form of discipline, one that stultifies 
the individual and collective imagination with its insistence that there is no 
alternative to the stratifying and competitive logics of the market (De Lissovoy 
2015). In this sense, neoliberal austerity is its own form of education, training 
subjects in the fatalistic discipline of capitulation to the powerful aura of the market 
in order to embrace what Mark Fisher (2009) describes as capitalist realism – a 
world in which capitalism is the only reality and in which there are no alternatives. 
In facing this scenario, we cannot take refuge, following the model of 
contemporary right wing populists, in the comfort of an imagined golden era of 
yesteryear, for there was no such golden era and even if there was the past 
cannot be recreated in the present. But this does not mean that the study of the 
past is futile for it surely has lessons to teach us. Indeed, past traditions and 
memories may serve as sources of inspiration that can be rethought and 
reworked. 
My discussion has highlighted how democracy today has been tamed and 
domesticated through its suturing with capitalism. I have argued that, particularly 
in its more recent and draconian guise of austerity, neoliberalism comprises a 
form of (re)education that seeks to compel us to accept an economistic reading 
of the world and of ourselves as subjects within it – a worldview dominated by 
logics of scarcity and competition amongst individualistically conceived actors, be 
these individuals, institutions or nations. I have also suggested that subscribing 
to this worldview involves accepting a fantasmatic deterministic reading of 
ourselves and the world – one that crucially reduces our scope for critical thought 
and agentive action by encouraging us to equate neoliberal structures and 
strictures with reality itself. This has reduced the scope for democracy in 
education as schools are increasingly positioned as exam factories, operating in 
the interest of what Lacan described as the ‘service of goods’. And just as 
capitalism promotes the fantasy that the next product or purchase will satisfy our 
desires by being ‘it’, so education and schooling hold out the promise of individual 
and social redemption through the accumulation of knowledge. I have also 
proposed that traversing this fantasy requires acknowledgement of the ways in 
which we are inserted into the machinery of neoliberalism at the levels of desire 
and action, rather than overly focusing on ideology as belief and being satisfied 
with a notion of resistance that is limited to this level.  
The challenge for democratic politics is to articulate an alternative vision, and 
find an alternative voice, rather than repeating the restrictive and reductive 
lessons offered by neoliberal austerity. To achieve this requires the imaginative 
deployment of conceptual, intellectual and practical resources. The challenge for 
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critical educators lies in the way neoliberal logics pit individuals (be they students, 
teachers, schools, sectors or systems) against one another within a high-stakes 
environment; by placing them in something akin to the prisoner’s dilemma, in 
which they literally have everything to lose, it thereby secures their attachment to 
their own subjection. Overcoming this challenge requires trust and collaboration, 
but it also requires a willingness to disagree and to accept that there are no perfect 
scenarios, which brings us back to the common ground of agonistic democracy 
and the possibilities for creative experimentation through prefigurative practice.  
But it also brings us back to notions like love, at least when this admittedly 
knotty phenomenon is read, as it is by Kaja Silverman, as “the provisional 
conferral of ideality upon socially devalued bodies” (1996: 4); for democracy 
requires reciprocal engagement with the plural perspectives of others and the 
world beyond. But in contrast to the Faustian exchange of neoliberalism, in which 
we gain (illusory) mastery and transcendence in return for accepting the 
inexorability of scarcity and competition, agonistic democracy offers potential site 
of plenitude and generosity, a space in which the world itself is (re)constructed by 
our subjective and inter-subjective engagement with it. It thus offers something 
we might describe as a worldly, three-dimensional education in contrast to the flat 
two-dimensional version prevalent under neoliberalism and austerity.  
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